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Paradoxes of Autonomy and Exceptionalism 
 in Molière and Madame de Lafayette
Abstract
The seventeenth century, in Europe, saw the rise of modern individualism: of the myth that 
humanity is composed of autonomous, competitive self-seekers who belong to society only 
in order to moderate the effects of their “natural” rapacity. Simultaneously, the modern epis-
temology that posits a detached, rational subject, acquiring definitive knowledge in order to 
manipulate a passive world of objects, arose and developed. This is the individual whom Ste-
phen Greenblatt famously called «self-fashioning». There are repressed paradoxes at the heart 
of this synthesis of the autonomous individual and the transcendent subject: the competitive 
individualist is motivated by self-interested desire, but the dominant modern conception of 
rationality requires a subject capable of transcending desire and the body, and competitive self-
interest can be pursued only in the social context. The attempted radical separation of subjec-
tivity from the body is, according to David Le Breton, an artifact of early modern Europe. Re-
cent research in linguistics, cognitive science, and evolutionary psychology undermines these 
myths of autonomy and objectivity, emphasizing the entanglement of the mind with emotions, 
the body, and the social group. The article finds these “new” insights anticipated by Molière 
and Madame de Lafayette, whose works dramatize both the ambitions of the emerging indi-
vidualists and the paradoxes inherent in those ambitions. Molière mocks a gallery of would-be 
autonomous subjects trying to escape reciprocity, emotion, and the body. In La Princesse de 
Clèves, Madame de Lafayette delves equally deeply into the tensions that arise when ambition 
inspires delusions of exceptionality.
The Myths of the Autonomous Individual and the Transcendent Subject 
The seventeenth century, in France and elsewhere in Europe, saw the rise of 
modern individualism: of the myth that humanity is composed of autonomous, com-
petitive self-seekers who belong to society only in order to moderate the effects of 
their “natural” rapacity. There are many commentators who locate the advent of this 
myth of the autonomous, self-maximizing individual squarely in the early modern 
period. Simultaneously, and complementarily, the modern epistemology that posits a 
detached, rational subject, acquiring definitive knowledge in order to manipulate a 
passive world of objects, arose and developed. This is the individual whom Stephen 
Greenblatt famously called «self-fashioning»1. 
The early modern atrophy of corporate entities that, for centuries, had provided 
individuals with both identity and constraint, was a factor here, as was the destabi-
lization of a dominant worldview by discoveries that were incompatible with it. The 
modern, detached, autonomous subject of supposedly certain knowledge arose from 
a situation of epistemological confusion. At the same time, the seeming emergence 
of the individual from dense webs of corporate relationships encouraged claims of 
(1) S. greenbLatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1980.
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freedom from mutual obligations, but also led to a craving for recognition. Where, 
after all, could a completely autonomous, and therefore perfectly isolated, individu-
al’s sense of identity possibly come from? Thus, opportunity and anxiety character-
ized this historical moment. Certainty was sought as an antidote to intense insecurity. 
Greenblatt’s self-fashioning individual was in anguish; he/she could «self-fashion» 
only in competition with and at the expense of others. And yet, however fashioned, 
the self required confirmation, which could obviously come only from the group. 
There are clearly repressed paradoxes at the heart of this synthesis of the autono-
mous individual and the transcendent subject: the competitive, atomized individual-
ist is motivated by self-interested desire, but the dominant modern conception of 
rationality requires a subject capable of transcending desire and the body, and com-
petitive self-interest can be pursued only in the social context. The attempted radical 
separation of subjectivity from the body is, according to David Le Breton, an artifact 
of early modern Europe2. It is worth noting in passing that Theophrastus, who was 
extremely influential in seventeenth-century France, argues that desires and emotions 
have their origin in corporeal motions. 
The myth of objectivity, which underpins the dominant modern epistemology, 
depends on just this denial of emotional, bodily, and social influences on perception 
and knowledge. Also paradoxically, attempts to repress or control emotion cause hy-
pertrophy of the repressed emotion. Jeremy Rifkin argues that Freud and other early 
psychologists perpetuated the modern conception of man as an individualist self-
maximizer, which itself inadvertently – subconsciously? – perpetuated the medieval 
idea of physical man as fallen3. There is no place for empathy in this worldview, and 
no place for the acceptance of vulnerability and of the need for others that Alasdair 
MacIntyre sees as vital to morally significant living. MacIntyre contends that our vul-
nerabilities and afflictions are essential to our self-knowledge and rationality4. The 
autonomous, exceptional individual is a fiction; the self is the sum of its bodily, emo-
tional, and relational history. “Self-knowledge” always depends on our experience of 
social interactions. As Theophrastus would have it, life is ruled more by fortune than 
by wisdom or morality.
This paradoxical situation led to the development of what J.P. Singh-Uberoi 
sees as two minds, or two kinds of mind, in Europe5. On the one hand, for example, 
Michel de Montaigne, in his Réflexions sur la maladie and other essays, emphasized 
the impact of the dispositions and conditions of the body and the emotions on the op-
erations of reason. On the other hand, René Descartes sought to escape the “trap” of 
the body and the emotions by fantasizing a mind capable of certainty because it was 
separate from them. Descartes’s English contemporary, Sir Francis Bacon, argued 
that dispassionately dissecting nature to expose its secrets would give humanity the 
power to construct a new world which would dependably serve human purposes. In 
the seventeenth century, Western European culture would be divided between those 
who, like Montaigne, could accept – who even preferred – ambiguity and ambiva-
lence, and those who wanted to believe that they could transcend uncertainty and all 
(2) D. Le breton, Anthropologie du corps et modernité, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2000, 
p. 62.
(3) J. riFkin, The Empathic Civilization: The Path to Global Consciousness in a World in Crisis, New 
York, Tarcher/Penguin, 2009, p. 45.
(4) A. MaCintyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, Chicago, Open 
Court, 1999, p. 1.
(5) J.P. singh-uberoi, The Other Mind of Europe: Goethe as a Scientist, Delhi, Bombay University Press, 
1984, p. 28.
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other existential limits. The seventeenth-century political philosopher, Thomas Hob-
bes, epitomized the specifically political paradox inherent in the individualist myth: 
Hobbes’s view of humans as inherently autonomous, fiercely competitive individuals 
led him to posit overwhelming State power as a necessary constraint. The “autono-
my” of rapacious individuals therefore justified the absolute power of Leviathan.
Recent Research Undermines the Myths
Much recent research in linguistics, cognitive science, and evolutionary psychol-
ogy undermines these myths of autonomy and objectivity by consistently emphasizing 
the inextricable entanglement of the mind with emotions, the body, and the social 
group. Primatologist Frans De Waal argues that, particularly in the modern period, 
we have been obsessed with what seems to place us “above” the animals, and that 
we have therefore committed ourselves to denial and repression6. In elucidating sig-
nificant continuities between human behavior and that of other primates, De Waal 
shows the primacy of affect and the falsity of the emotion/reason duality7. We are 
situated not only in the body and the emotions, but also in the group. Relationship 
precedes individuality and is more fundamental8. Reason and emotion constantly 
interact9. The very ambition to be autonomous, to be an exception to this involve-
ment in the body and in the group, makes sense only in a social context. Who would 
acknowledge the autonomy and the exceptionality of an individual? The desire for 
autonomous individuality is hardly exceptional if we believe that everybody feels it 
and is motivated by it.
The self is thus always existentially situated; sociality, empathy, and reciprocity 
are more fundamental than individuality in human behavior. Neuroscientist Antonio 
Damasio, in a study aptly called Descartes’s Error, says that there is no pure rea-
son, that the body and emotions serve to structure and motivate thought10. Linguists 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argue that all thought depends on sensory percep-
tion, bodily movement, and physical situation11. According to Lakoff and Johnson, 
we can communicate, at all, only because of the commonalities of our bodily experi-
ence12. Reason and language are thus locally situated bodily functions. Like Damasio, 
De Waal criticizes Descartes and debunks the claims of “pure” reason and the myth 
of the separate, independent, competitive individual who accepts social life only to 
ease strife13. Society and reciprocity are foundational, not derivative or “voluntary”. 
Moreover, evolutionary biologist Edward O. Wilson argues that, in modernity, pres-
sures on individuals intensify as roles become more numerous and the number of 
(6) F. de waaL, The Age of Empathy: Nature’s Lessons for a Kinder Society, New York, Crown / Random 
House, 2010, p. 15.
(7) F. de waaL, Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University 
Press, 2009, p. 6.
(8) J. riFkin, op. cit., p. 28.
(9) Ibid., pp. 146-47.
(10) A. daMasio, Descartes’s Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, New York, Penguin, 1994, 
p. 248.
(11) G. LakoFF and M. Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenges to 
Western Thought, New York, Basic Books, 1999, p. 4.
(12) Ibid., p. 151.
(13) F. de waaL, Empathy cit., p. 20.
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roles that each must play increases. The problem of the self arises from this multiplic-
ity14. As an ideology, individualism is the anxious response to a sense of disintegration. 
Empathy and exchange are required to resolve moral dilemmas and to support 
individual identity. However, mutually beneficial exchange is incompatible with the 
desire to be radically autonomous and exceptional. Rifkin argues that understand-
ing comes not from detached analysis, but from empathic communion15. All of these 
scholars emphasize that dependence and vulnerability are central to human experi-
ence. Detachment from the body and the emotions is as illusory as is independence 
of others.
Molière and Madame de Lafayette Had Already Undermined the Myths
I find that these contemporary insights are anticipated by a number of early 
modern French writers whose works dramatize both the ambitions of the emerging 
individualists and the paradoxes inherent in those ambitions. I will look closely at 
two of these writers here. Among the most trenchant critics of individualist delusions 
is Molière, who mocks a gallery of would-be autonomous subjects trying to escape 
reciprocity, emotion, and the body. His comic types reflect what James F. Gaines 
recently termed «an age of Absolutism that was trying to free itself from the contin-
gencies of ordinary life»16. Molière’s ridicules wish, and claim, to be exceptions, to be 
above and beyond existential limits. In La Princesse de Clèves, Madame de Lafayette 
delves equally deeply into the tensions that arise when ambition inspires delusions 
of exceptionality. We will see that the Princesse’s mother’s ambition to make her an 
exceptional, and therefore an exceptionally desirable, object condemns the Princesse 
to sacrifice her own desire to a wholly sterile isolation from the society wherein ex-
ceptionality must be sought, but cannot be achieved. These authors’ treatment of the 
desire to be exceptional powerfully illuminates a central paradox that I have men-
tioned: the ambition to be an exception can be expressed only in a social context, and 
the status of exception would be meaningful only if recognized and acknowledged 
by others. This ineluctable reality undermines pretensions of autonomy and seals the 
individual’s entanglement in a network of exchanges. The “autonomous” individual, 
liberated from constraining corporate entities, required and justified overwhelming 
State power to control him; the isolated individual, bereft of the support of corporate 
entities, wandered and raged, or whimpered, in search of identity. 
Paradoxes of Autonomy and Transcendence in Molière
Molière’s relentless comic deconstruction of efforts to gain absolute control and 
comprehensive knowledge directly challenges the belief that definitive truth can be 
found, and thereby undermines the claim that knowledge can buttress or justify any 
kind of authoritarianism. As we have seen, the desire for transcendence, and trans-
cendent power, requires suppression of emotion and of the body. Comic theatre fore-
grounds the body, with all of its desire, clumsiness, and vulnerability. It constantly 
(14) E.O. wiLson, On Human Nature, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2004, p. 95.
(15) J. riFkin, op. cit., p. 154.
(16) J. gaines, Molière and Paradox: Skepticism and Theater in the Early Modern Age, Tübingen, Narr 
Verlag, 2010, «Biblio 17», p. 47.
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reminds us of the contingent and the relational17. Comedy is thus inherently hostile to 
delusions of autonomy and transcendence. Molière shows that it is ridiculous to pre-
tend to be a disembodied mind, or an autonomously self-fashioning individual, when 
all can see one’s desiring, performing, vulnerable body. Georges Forestier makes the 
useful related point that, in the seventeenth-century French context, Molière, him-
self, would have hesitated to claim originality, or autonomy, for himself as author18. 
Michael Call devotes an extremely interesting new book to exploring the complex 
network of contingencies that conditioned authorship, itself, for Molière and his con-
temporaries. In the plays, as Call demonstrates, delusions of autonomy and epistemo-
logical control are often linked to the question of authority, or authorship19. 
Molière’s comic absolutists are actually engaged in trying to create a world to 
which their version of Truth would be adequate. They want to force the world, in-
cluding other people, into a form to which their version of truth is appropriate, and 
which they can completely dominate. In a recent article on Molière’s Le Bourgeois 
gentilhomme, Ralph Albanese elucidates the dramatist’s critique of the illusion that 
knowledge can fulfill the desire for self-transformation and control20. This reflects 
the times: in what Michel de Certeau called the age of representations21 and Philip 
Sherrard termed the epoch of abstraction22, maps, mathematical models, and other 
representations were imposed on, and then substituted for, the real, natural world. 
Knowledge was expected to confer enormous manipulative power. There was, in 
the emerging epistemology, a strong preference for willed constructs over the given 
world. However, such constructs are motivated conceptions; they seem to confirm 
delusions of “autonomy”, but their origin in desires will out. 
From Arnolphe, in L’École des femmes, to Argan, in Le Malade imaginaire, 
Molière’s comic types seek transcendence by denying feelings and mortifying bod-
ies, their own and others’. In Molière’s œuvre, there is, in fact, a kind of progres-
sion through the plays to Argan’s attempt to cheat death. Argan encounters the truth 
about his life only when he pretends to be dead. All of Molière’s major characters can 
be seen as hopelessly naïve, and desperately hungry, avatars of the Cartesian subject, 
supposedly separate from and independent of the “objects” of knowledge and ma-
nipulation. The desire to manipulate is, paradoxically, the very definition of entangle-
ment. 
Molière critics often argue that one or another of the plays is “archetypal”. It 
seems to me that, at best, this depends entirely on which aspect of the plays one is fo-
cusing on. For my purposes, here, I will say that it is illuminating to begin by looking 
at Le Misanthrope. Despite, or, rather, because of, his wish for radical separateness, 
the main character, Alceste, is involved in a social network. He wants to be distin-
guished – as he says, in verse 63, «Je veux qu’on me distingue»23 – to be an exception. 
The very grammar of this sentence implicitly acknowledges that distinction is both 
(17) L. riggs, Molière and Modernity: Absent Mothers and Masculine Births, Chalottesville, VA, Rook-
wood Press, 2005, p. 205.
(18) G. Forestier, Le Théâtre dans le théâtre, Genève, Droz, 1996, p. 70.
(19) M. CaLL, The Would-Be Author: Molière and the Comedy of Print, West Lafayette, IN, Purdue 
University Press, 2015.
(20) R. aLbanese, La Dialectique savoir/ignorance dans “Le Bourgeois gentilhomme”, forthcoming in Le 
Nouveau moliériste.
(21) M. de Certeau, Heterologies: Discourse on the Other, trans. B. Massumi, Minneapolis, University 
of Minnesota, 1986, p. 180.
(22) P. sherrard, The Rape of Man and Nature: An Enquiry into the Origins and Consequences of Modern 
Science, Ipswich, UK, Golgonooza Press, 1987, p. 49.
(23) MoLière, Œuvres Complètes, Paris, Editions du Seuil and The Macmillan Company, 1962, p. 324.
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an object of desire and something that can only be conferred by others; it would be 
a social construct. Again, the desire to be recognized as exceptional is the essence of 
dependence. 
Alceste, whom Gaines calls an «absolute nominalist»24, wants all words to have a 
clear meaning whose stability confirms his own. In one of his many felicitous phrases, 
Gaines characterizes Alceste’s quest as a «Cartesian nostalgia for simple knowledge»25. 
Alceste tries to ignore the fact that real communication is a network of exchanges in 
which interlocutors influence and interpret and sometimes deceive each other. The 
play dramatizes the consequences of Alceste’s refusal to accept the necessity – and 
the responsibility – of interpretation; he refuses to think of communication as contin-
gent reciprocal exchange. 
Alceste’s insistence that others be sincere is, in fact, a desire for knowledge and 
control. He wants others to be transparent to him and to recognize his uniqueness, 
but, paradoxically, what the play shows is his resemblance to them. In fact, all of the 
characters are alike in their quest for recognition and distinction, but they can offer 
each other only involvement in a motivated exchange of contingent communication. 
In any case, exchanges of recognition must be recognizable, and thus they cannot be 
unique; if they were truly unique, they could not be deciphered. Gérard Defaux goes 
so far as to see in Le Misanthrope an auto-critique by Molière, a recognition that his 
authorial stance as critic of character flaws in others is untenable26. 
Paradoxically, then, language meeting Alceste’s standard would not be commu-
nication; it would be meaningless. He could never be recognized as completely dis-
tinct. Michael Hawcroft points out the contradiction inherent in the fact that Alceste 
wants his departure from society to be spectacular27. His egotism must have an audi-
ence. Moreover, Alceste’s demand that others be perfectly sincere is a futile absolutist 
attempt to escape the realities of ordinary life. His need reflects early modernity’s 
increasingly nervous concern with sincerity. Rifkin plausibly attributes this anxiety to 
the fact that individual identity was no longer dependably defined by group affilia-
tion28. Alceste is surrounded by atomized individuals who, like himself, are compet-
ing for distinction. The “world” of Célimène’s household is a microcosmic dramatiza-
tion of the one implied by the modern myth of individualism.
In Tartuffe, the Impostor’s dupe, Orgon, is another living paradox, in that his 
desire for control makes him easy to manipulate. Like Molière’s other comic types, 
Orgon ignores motives, especially his own and those of his seducer. Despite describ-
ing Tartuffe, in verse 272, as «un homme», Orgon does not consider that having 
motives, or desires, is part of the definition of a man. Orgon must ignore motives, 
for the usual molièresque reason: he wants his own motives to be the environment in 
which others must live. He wants his desire to be, literally, their world. This brings us 
to yet another of the playwright’s deepest paradoxes: the desire to absorb all into the 
self, to make of the self a world, does not eliminate vulnerability; it greatly increases 
it. Orgon’s pseudo-ascetic rejection of love for his family, and of emotion in general, 
does not make him exceptional or powerful; it makes him typical of would-be self-
fashioners with delusions of grandeur. Paradoxically, it also allows Tartuffe’s desire 
to displace and replace Orgon’s, just as Tartuffe takes possession of his dupe’s house.
(24) J. gaines, op. cit., p. 79.
(25) Ibid., p. 89.
(26) G. deFaux, Molière, ou les métamorphoses du comique: de la comédie morale au triomphe de la folie, 
Lexington, KY, 1980, «French Forum», pp. 527 ff.
(27) M. hawCroFt, Molière: Reasoning with Fools, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 170.
(28) J. riFkin, op. cit., p. 274.
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Arnolphe, in L’École des femmes, is another character who wants to construct 
a dominant, invulnerable self. Arnolphe has always seemed to me to be an obvious 
parody of Descartes, foolishly convinced that his special knowledge, and the méthode 
by which he applies it, will enable him to transcend the bodily, emotional world of 
risk and uncertainty – of doubt. Arnolphe’s attempt to prove that his method for 
avoiding cuckoldry is foolproof, because it is based on his “knowledge” of what 
causes cuckoldry, will be undermined by the existential reality of feelings, including 
his own. Hawcroft argues that the play’s comic effects are based on the incongruity 
between Arnolphe’s confidence in his plan and its utter failure to work29. Not only 
does the plan not work, it is itself the very means by which Arnolphe’s fate is realized. 
Paradoxically, but inevitably, Arnolphe’s enclosure of his ward, Agnès, in a prison 
of isolation and ignorance will make her vulnerable to her very first experience of 
reciprocal romantic communication. Arnolphe’s denial of his own love – of his desire 
for emotional exchange with Agnès – deprives him of empathy, and thus makes him 
hopelessly ignorant of the realities of human interaction. The play dramatizes the fun-
damental need for authentic exchange and the fact that, because of this need, there 
can be no manipulation of others from a safely detached position. 
Here, at the beginning of modernity’s long infatuation with “objectivity”, Molière 
establishes what might be called a Heisenberg Principle of human relations: the self 
is inextricably implicated in every social exchange. Desire seals involvement. From 
the play’s opening debate about cuckoldry, we can see that Arnolphe is so stupefied 
by his “knowledge” and his method that he does not know that his own behavior 
will make it less likely that Agnès will love him and be faithful. Arnolphe desperately 
denies the fact that thought cannot precede or control experienced reality, and the 
method he trusts to overcome contingency is, paradoxically and appropriately, the 
means by which his desire is frustrated and his fear is realized. 
In L’Avare, Harpagon certainly rejects both risk and exchange, hoarding his 
wealth as a means of gaining absolute control over his family, and even of escaping 
the natural succession of generations. The most significant paradoxes in this play are 
that Harpagon’s strategy of starving his household intensifies everyone’s appetites, 
thereby increasing resistance to his vigilance, and that his “enjoyment” of his wealth 
takes the form of fear that it will be stolen. Here, Molière revisits a paradox first 
sketched in L’École des femmes: the value of property, including a wife regarded 
as property, as in Arnolphe’s case, depends on the belief that others covet it, or 
her. The very value of the individual’s possessions is, then, dependent on others’ 
supposed desire for them. One must fear theft or cuckoldry in order to value one’s 
wealth or one’s wife. Possession equals paranoia, and only acceptance of risk and 
of the other’s independent subjectivity can make a healthy reciprocal relationship 
possible. Harpagon’s regime of mortification, and his substituting money for other 
values, install insatiable hunger at the heart of his world. The desire for money is by 
definition a hypertrophic desire; it can never be satisfied, because it is an abstract 
appetite. Money is an unsatisfying substitute for more concrete, more natural, and 
less controllable objects of desire. 
Yet another instance of pseudo-asceticism, and of supposedly special knowledge 
used to consolidate power, is Les Femmes savantes. Philaminte and her transcen-
dentalist disciples are, paradoxically, enslaved by their ambition to the hack poet 
and pseudo-philosopher, Trissotin. Their desire for absolute authority makes them 
as subservient to this mountebank as Orgon is to Tartuffe. A principal paradox here 
(29) M. hawCroFt, op. cit., p. 56.
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lies in the learned ladies’ attempt to parlay abstractionist language into a form of 
transcendence that will give them absolute cultural power. 
The grounding of the ladies’ metaphors, and of their desire for power, in earth-
ly – and earthy – reality constantly reminds us that transcendence is a rhetorical il-
lusion. Molière thus anticipates a central point of Lakoff and Johnson’s work: our 
thinking is inescapably metaphorical, and metaphors derive their meaning from their 
physical terms, or roots30. Molière also anticipates here, with brilliant linguistic irony, 
Wilson’t contention that even our “highest” cultural achievements depend complete-
ly on our biological nature31. The savantes’ transcendentalist rhetoric, made as it is of 
metaphors, thus mocks their ambition to be above the common condition. Trissotin 
is an avatar of Tartuffe, and the learned ladies are, like Orgon, dupes of their own am-
bition. Their pretensions make them mere breeding stock, or copying machines, for 
the propagation of abstractionist language. Their denial of their own desires makes 
them creatures of Trissotin’s wants. Like Orgon, they allow themselves to be inha-
bited by another’s very concrete desire. In this play, Molière denounces knowledge 
and authority claiming to be both above the physical world and universally valid, just 
as he lampooned, in Tartuffe, similar claims for the language of dévotion. There are 
no exceptions to the earthbound human condition; believing that there can be such 
exceptions opens the deluded to displacement by purveyors of false transcendence. 
In Le Malade imaginaire, Argan’s version of the delusional lust for transcend-
ence is focused explicitly on manipulation of his body. Argan is determined to be the 
ultimate exception: he wants to transcend bodily degeneration and death. Constant 
counting seems to serve Argan’s illusory transcendence, to flatter his desire for ab-
straction from the body. Gaines may have revealed that this play provides Molière’s 
most incisive critique of modernity’s epistemological ambition and arrogance. Ever 
the master of historical context, Gaines reminds us that the early modern coincidence 
of the birth of pharmaceutics and the raging scourge of syphilis in Europe generated 
a shattering medical paradox: the short-term “cure” of the pox with mercury usually 
led to death, in the longer term32. Moreover, not only is Argan undoubtedly weakened 
by his numerous cures and enslaved and exploited by their purveyors, but his desire 
to transcend the body, and to avoid its death, keeps his nose firmly planted in the 
smell of his body’s effluvia. The desire to transcend and control the body leads to an 
exaggerated attachment to it. Molière’s embodiment of Argan, as he himself strug-
gled with what would be a truly fatal illness, is a paradox that escapes the theatre to 
invade real life.
In Amphitryon, not even a god can be exceptional. In this play, not only the self’s 
delusions of transcendence, but also the illusion of having a stable identity, at all, are 
deconstructed. In fact, even the divine Jupiter is able to have his way with Alcmène 
only by pretending to be her husband, Amphitryon. Call follows Max Vernet in as-
serting that this play is quintessentially theatrical: it dramatizes the dramatic, showing 
the paradoxical coexistence of stability and mutability at the core of the self 33. Jupiter 
cannot derive any unadulterated satisfaction from his conquest, since it is not really 
“He” who conquers. His divine power cannot enable him to escape the contingencies 
of human life. Even a god must become a desiring, performing actor in order to enter 
(30) G. LakoFF and M. Johnson, op. cit., p. 210.
(31) E.O. wiLson, In Search of Nature, Washington, D.C., Shearwater, 1996, p. 100.
(32) J. gaines, op. cit., pp. 130-131.
(33) M. vernet, Molière: Côté jardin, côté cour, Paris, A.-G. Nizet, 1991, p. 114. Call, pp. 8-9.
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into a relationship with a human being. The ultimate existential futility of delusions 
of power could not be more effectively evoked. 
Paradoxes of Virtue and Exceptionality in “La Princesse de Clèves”
I have always been tempted to read the final words of La Princesse de Clèves – «et 
sa vie, qui fut assez courte, laissa des exemples de vertu inimitables»34 – as an ironical 
comment on the sterility and inhumanity of Mademoiselle de Chartres’s/Madame de 
Clèves’s fate. Is the ending a surprise, or is it the completion of a destiny set in motion 
by the Princesse’s mother’s determination to make her daughter exceptional? Is that ex-
ceptionalism itself a trap? Pierre Force explicitly compares the Princesse to the Molière 
characters whose fundamental error is regarding themselves as exceptions to some gen-
eral rule about humanity35. I see Molière’s critique of exceptionalism in broader terms, 
and I believe that Madame de Lafayette shared the comedian’s view. In a sense, there 
are no general rules about humanity, other than the fact that every individual must seek 
identity and pursue purposes within a society and within the constraints defined by the 
body and the emotions. As I argued in looking at Molière’s plays, the desire for distinc-
tion and control makes sense only within the social context, and therefore makes the 
would-be exception the creature of his or her social partners. It is a matter for recipro-
cal exchange. Society pressures all of its members to resemble one another, if only inso-
far as they are all competing for the recognition that only they, as a group, can confer. 
Does the Princesse de Clèves ultimately opt out of courtly society because she 
feels the pull of this logic of convergence? Is distinction or exceptionality whose 
price is flight to a desert – an excellent reason for considering Le Misanthrope and 
La Princesse de Clèves in the same essay – meaningless? Does the Princesse’s retire-
ment from the Court represent the attainment of a relative independence, or is it the 
ultimate triumph of patriarchal repression, the ultimate infantilization of a woman? 
In the seventeenth-century context, is there really anything truly exceptional about 
withdrawing – for a part of each year – to a convent? The ending is implicit in the 
beginning, since the Princesse has been taught by her mother that to resemble other 
women is to be disgraced, but the consequences of her mother’s ambition have made 
that resemblance inevitable. 
Of what use, in fact, are inimitable examples? The novel’s final sentence seems 
to me to be quintessentially paradoxical. Does the heroine attain transcendence of 
disorder and anxiety, achieving a state like the précieux ideal of high status through 
indefinite suspension, or does the process begun by her mother’s pedagogy consign 
her to a sterile space of repression essentially like the one constructed for Agnès by 
the paranoiac Arnolphe, in L’Ecole des femmes? Is her withdrawal to be understood 
as a positive assertion of an independent identity, or is it the culmination of a pro-
cess whereby a false and impossible identity has been imposed on her? Madame de 
Chartres has taught her daughter that virtue requires «une extrême defiance de soi-
même»36, that the virtuous self is divided against itself. 
In my reading, the situation wherein Madame de Clèves is forced to live has 
much in common with what all of Molière’s tyrannical, patriarchal buffoons threaten 
(34) MadaMe de LaFayette, Romans et Nouvelles, Paris, Garnier Frères, 1961, p. 395.
(35) P. ForCe, Molière ou le prix des choses: morale, économie et comédie, Paris, Editions Nathan, 1994, 
pp. 49-50.
(36) Ibid., p. 248.
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to impose on the young women whom they seek to control. Madame de Chartres acts 
as an agent of patriarchy, forcing her daughter to internalize the paradoxical impera-
tive to be exceptionally virtuous, while maximizing her desirability within the regime 
of exchanges that rules her society. 
Ursula A. Kelly, in focusing particularly on the early modern and modern educa-
tion of young women, argues that schooling or pedagogy is a «mode of social con-
trol», designed to produce particular forms of subjectivity and to elicit certain kinds 
of participation in social life37. Education, most effectively deployed in the form of 
stories, constructs desire, forming subjectivities who substitute for “natural” objects 
of desire those that it is convenient for the social order to provide. Kelly shows that 
stories serve as means of forming socially acceptable, self-disciplining subjects, and 
are thus fundamental to systems of social control. Madame de Chartres’s moralistic 
pedagogy illustrates Kelly’s point admirably: she uses tendentious stories to teach her 
daughter to make virtue the principal object of her desire38. 
As I have argued, this pedagogy places Mademoiselle de Chartres in a paradoxi-
cal situation. Since it is designed to enhance her value in the marketplace of marriage, 
it requires that she be, ultimately, conventional, not exceptional. Her value must be 
recognizable. It also requires her to identify virtue with self-distrust. Insofar as vir-
tue is an object of desire for her, her “desire” is in conflict with her desire. As Kelly 
would put it, education has formed the Princesse to desire what amounts to a socially 
valuable version of herself. She has internalized the contradictory imperatives of her 
social milieu and of her mother’s pedagogy. 
The stories of “fallen” women that form the core of Madame de Chartres’s 
moralistic teaching resemble the tales of women’s nefarious influence during the 
Fronde that Domna Stanton refers to in her The Fiction of “Préciosité” and the Fear 
of Women39. This supports my suggestion that Madame de Chartres has designed her 
daughter to be a valuable commodity within the patriarchal order, indeed, to serve 
as a support for that order. Her pedagogy, in other words, actually makes it impos-
sible for her daughter to be truly exceptional. Mademoiselle de Chartres is formed by 
the sort of stories that Stanton associates with the cultural and political castration of 
women. The Princesse, thanks to her mother’s loyalty to patriarchy, can “virtuously” 
desire only to repress her own desire. 
Paradoxically, then, Madame de Chartres’ ambition, which expresses itself 
in her ambition to make her daughter exceptional, creates the circumstances that 
threaten to make her typical, to make of her a character in another cautionary tale. 
There are, in fact, several dimensions of paradox in the novel. First of all, in order 
to enhance her daughter’s value in the competitive marketplace of aristocratic mar-
riage, Madame de Chartres educates her in isolation from the Court. She shelters 
her. Then, she throws her to the wolves. Moreover, this protection, combined with 
the inculcation of devotion to virtue, makes Mademoiselle de Chartres more ap-
petizing. Thirdly, as she adds to her daughter’s value on the market, Madame de 
Chartres also increases her vulnerability while also making her more relentlessly 
pursued. Mademoiselle de Chartres is in a situation analogous to that of Agnès: 
having no experience of erotic exchange, she risks being seduced by its first ap-
pearance in her life. 
(37) U. keLLy, Schooling Desire: Literacy, Cultural Politics, and Pedagogy, London, Routledge, 1997, p. 1.
(38) Ibid., p. 248.
(39) D. stanton, The Fiction of “Préciosité” and the Fear of Women, «Yale French Studies» 62, 1981, 
pp. 107-134. 
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In making what I believe is a closely related point, Jane Marie Todd refers to 
Michel Foucault’s contention that the modern subject, characterized by introspection 
and self-criticism, is formed by internalizing power40. Internalizing her mother’s pow-
erful lessons has linked the Princesse’s pride inextricably to her self-distrust, to exer-
cising what little power she has against herself. Her very sense of self contains a para-
dox, a contradiction. Here again, we have something very much like what Arnolphe 
tries to impose on Agnès: he wants Agnès literally to internalize the strictures of the 
maximes du marriage – «Imprimez-le-vous-bien», he commands, in verse 67841 – in 
order to make it integral to her subjectivity. Madame de Chartres’s lessons similarly 
make up the fund of negative examples which amount to internalized proscriptions 
for her daughter. 
The Princesse has internalized the paradox of virtue. In fact, virtue is a paradox. 
What, in fact, makes virtue valuable? As a form of ornamentation, giving éclat and 
élévation42 to a woman, virtue works to intensify the very desire it is supposed to pro-
tect against. It is comparable to the jewels that Mademoiselle de Chartres is selecting 
when Monsieur de Clèves first sees her. Virtue is, ultimately, the most appetizing of 
the decorative attributes that draw the predatory male gaze. It thus increases the 
power of that which it is supposed to resist. Virtue is also a prize and a prospective 
guarantee in a context defined by pervasive infidelity and dangerous male rivalry. If 
a virtuous woman is “won”, her value immediately decreases. Virtue as an appetizer 
for males is, therefore, incompatible with any form of consummated love; and yet, its 
value also depends on the belief that the woman may be accessible. For the Princesse, 
the degree to which she can aspire to be exceptional is the degree to which she is 
desired. Thus, her education, in forming her to desire virtue, has formed her to desire 
to be desired, but also to desire to repress her own desire. She must be an extremely 
desirable object within the conventional economy of courtly relations. Her attractive-
ness must be displayed in sufficiently conventional form to be recognized. And yet, 
she must desire only to live the paradox. 
Still another dimension of paradox is that Madame de Chartres’s ambition and 
pride – she is «extrêmement glorieuse»43 – lead her to place her daughter in the very 
circumstances that will maximize the difficulty of her remaining virtuous. Once she 
is married to a man whom she does not love, Madame de Clèves is in precisely the 
situation for which her education has not prepared her, except by making her fearful 
of the male desire she has been formed to attract, and by putting her at odds with her 
own desires. In fact, does not virtue, as Madame de Lafayette has elucidated it for 
us, imply the woman’s internalizing male desire, male rivalry, and male jealousy as the 
objects of her desire, as well as of her fear? She must desire to be desired in order to 
demonstrate her capacity to resist, and that resistance will make her more desirable. 
Again, we encounter the paradox of distinction, or of exceptionalism. Madame 
de Chartres intends to make her daughter a creature whose superior virtue and val-
ue – whose status of exception – will be recognized by all. However, subjecting her 
daughter to the pressures of the Court, and, most of all, marrying her to a man she 
does not love, make it inevitable that she will become typical. Is it, in fact, possible for 
a society to perceive value in what truly lies outside its lexicon of generalizations, its 
(40) J. todd, The Power of Confession: The Ideology of Love in “La Princesse de Clèves”, in P. Henry, An 
Inimitable Example: The Case for The “Princesse de Clèves”, Washington, D.C., The Catholic University of 
America Press, 1992, pp. 225-234.
(41) MoLière, op. cit., p. 185.
(42) Ivi, p. 248.
(43) Ibid..
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fund of recognized values? To the extent that Madame de Chartres has brought an 
unusually desirable young woman to Court, she has made her the object of the men’s 
desire to distinguish themselves by possessing her. Paradoxically, like all competi-
tion, this generalized rivalry has a leveling effect. As is the case in Le Misanthrope, 
the characters resemble one another in their thirst for distinction. In my reading of 
the novel, this leads to the most persuasive interpretation of Madame de Lafayette’s 
prodigal use of superlatives: like the final sentence, it is ironical. At Court, there is 
nothing more typical than pretensions to exceptionality. If everyone is superlative, 
then no one is exceptional. Nothing could be more typical at Court than Madame de 
Chartres’s pride and ambition. How could we expect her daughter, who is the instru-
ment of that pride and ambition, to sustain her exceptionality? 
I have argued that virtue in the novel has meaning and value only as a quality that 
both awakens and resists male desire, and that thereby both assuages and exacerbates 
male fear of and aggression toward rivals. Moreover, a woman must want to be de-
sired by more than one man if she wants to be known as virtuous. The issue of what 
her own desire might be focused on, other than the reputation for virtue that depends 
on others and whets male appetites, cannot arise. Madame de Clèves’s marriage to a 
man she does not love can only intensify her need for that which is condemned and 
excluded by the essentially patriarchal moral curriculum that has shaped her. Inter-
nalizing her mother’s powerful lessons, which are rendered irresistible by Madame 
de Chartres’s brilliantly manipulative management of her own death, has linked her 
daughter’s pride inextricably to her self-distrust. The Princesse’s fate is definitively 
sealed by her husband’s death, a death caused by the male’s jealousy and fear of a 
rival, a jealousy and fear that were inherent in and necessary to her mother’s attempt 
to make her exceptional, in the first place.
Conclusion
Molière and Madame de Lafayette, along with a number of other early modern 
writers, question the emerging myth of the autonomous, self-fashioning individual. 
I hope I have argued persuasively that they anticipate the findings of cutting-edge 
linguistics, evolutionary psychology, and cognitive science by showing the primacy of 
involvement and exchange. Is exceptionalism a rejection of vulnerability, fallibility, 
dependence, and mortality? Is it, rather than merely an attempt to escape the reach 
of a particular generalization, a desire to transcend the fundamental contingencies of 
human life? 
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